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Optimal Level of Self-Organized Segregation of Evolutionary Minority Game
Author(s): 
Pages: 191-195
Year: Issue:  2
Journal: JOURNAL OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Keyword:  争当少数者博弈模型模仿演化;
Abstract: 提出并研究了一种新的演化少数者博弈模型.在该模型中.每个经纪人有一个几率p值.在给定m比特下,每个经纪人以几率p选择去最近相同m比特历史下的取胜方,以几率1-p作出相反的决定,同时经纪人可以模仿财富高于自己的最近邻邻居的p值并加以修正,数值模拟结果显示,经纪人的新几率p和他最佳邻居的几率之间的相关程度存在一个最佳值.在此处自组织分离效应最强,经纪人自分离成尺寸几乎相同的由极端行为表征的人群和反人群,明显提高了系统的协作.
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