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ji yu kong qi gong gong wu pin shu xing de tan pai fang yu tan jian pai duo zhu ti bo zuo fen xi
Author(s): 
Pages: 16-20
Year: Issue:  12
Journal: Enterprise Economy

Keyword:  carbon emissionscarbon reductiongame analysislack of suppliesallocation efficiency;
Abstract: In this paper, the author has analyzed the differences between the aggregate carbon emissions and the aggregate carbon reductions under the Nash equilibrium and those under the Pareto equilibrium, and discussed the root of excessive carbon emissions and the problem about the use efficiency of air resources, from the individual and whole perspectives, by using the game analysis. This paper believes that the economic source of serious air pollution is that clear air is a kind of public resources whose property rights can’t be defined, the total social net emissions are greater than those under the Pareto equilibrium, and excessive total social carbon emissions are the inevitable results of the multi- agent game around the consumption behavior of the clear air, whereas insufficient total social carbon emission reductions are the inevitable results of the multi- agent game around the governance behavior of the polluted air. The paper will provide us the theoretical basis for economic mechanism design and institutional arrangement of the low carbon economy.
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