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The (2,2)Bayesian Rational Secret Sharing Sche me
Author(s): LIU Hai, PENG Chang-gen, TIAN You-liang, LZhen, LIU Rong-fei
Pages: 2481-
2488
Year: 2014
Issue:
12
Journal: Acta Electronica Sinica
Keyword: rational secret sharing; incomplete information; belief system; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; mechanism design;
Abstract: The rational secret sharing is an intersection direction between the traditional secret sharing and game theory .In the rational secret sharing scheme,the selfishness maybe impels rational players to deviate from the protocols so as to influence the fairness of scheme .In the existing threshold rational secret sharing schemes,the fairness of (2,2)rational secret sharing scheme, which is a special case,is hard to be realized,especially implementing on the asynchronous communication channel .To achieve fair-ness of (2,2)rational secret sharing over the asynchronous communication channel,this paper firstly analyzes rational players’utili-ty by simultaneously discussing their short-term interest and long-term interest .Then through illustrating rational players’available actions and belief systems,and computing their expected utilities with the dynamic games of incomplete information,the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for reconstruction phase of (2,2)rational secret sharing is studied.Furthermore,combining with the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)mechanism of design theory,the incentive compatibility mechanism,which is named recording interaction, is designed to restrict the behavior of rational players.Consequently,the fair (2,2)rational secret sharing scheme is presented, which does not need the dealer to keep on-line over the asynchronous communication channel .
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