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Information Structure, Financial Supervision and the Behavior of Financial Organizations——Game Analysis Based on Principal Agent
Pages: 84-88
Year: Issue:  6
Journal: Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

Abstract: 金融机构的代理投资行为受到监管部门的监管.金融监管者旨在增加社会福利,而信息的非对称性限制了这一目标的实现.通过建立监管条件下金融消费者、金融机构和监管者之间的多方博弈模型,分析信息结构对代理冲突、监管行为以及社会福利的影响.结果表明,违规所带来的高风险溢价诱使金融机构违反监管政策,且非对称信息降低了监管者的监管努力程度,诱使金融机构从事违规活动,降低总的社会福利.
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