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The game analysis of tournament incentive mechanism and the collusion between agents
Author(s): 
Pages: 693-697
Year: Issue:  4
Journal: Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities(Natrual Science Edition)

Keyword:  rank-order wageincentivecollusionre-negotiation ;
Abstract: Through establishing the game model of tournament and the the collusion between the agents, it is discovered that the tournament incentive scheme based on performance could realize campatible incentive when there is no collusion between the agents. However, the collusion between the agents improve the payoff of agents, and damage the profits of principal. In this situation, the best strategy of principal is renegotiating with the one of the agents. Furthermore, re-negotiation could realize the second best solution of the contract.
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